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been: Give WQXR the opportunity for oral argument on its allegations of
public interest. Decide, upon the basis of the facts alleged and upon all
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them, whether these
facts, if proven, would show that the public interest demands that extraor-
dinary protection be accorded WQXR's broadcasting service. If you de-
cide that the allegations are insufficient to warrant additional protection,
you must give a full explanation why they are insufficient. If you decide
that they are sufficient, you must give WQXR an opportunity to prove them
in a trial-type hearing 82 Had the court done this, it would have contributed
greatly toward a rational reconciliation of the conflicting demands of flexi-
bility and predictability in the administration of the Communications Act.
JEROME K. FROST
Constitutional Law—First Amendment Protection of the Right to Picket
and State Public Policy.—Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Cti
Confectionary Workers.'—This action was commenced by respondent-cor-
poration in the Los Angeles County Court to enjoin appellant-union's alleged
trespass upon property which respondent had leased from the City of Tor-
rance, California, and was operating as a shopping center. Appellant, in its
attempt to organize the employees of Revels' Bakery Shop, a sub-lessee in the
center, commenced and maintained, over respondent's objection, a peaceful
organizational picket line on the center's sidewalk immediately in front of
the sub-lessee's shop.2 The county court granted an injunction on the basis
that the center's sidewalk had been provided for use by the sub-lessee's
actual and potential customers; appellant, by its maintenance of the picket
line, was not using the sidewalk for its intended purpose; such action con-
stituted a trespass. 2 The primary question on appeal was whether a lessee
of property, who has the right to exclusive possession and is not a party to a
labor dispute, can enjoin, as a trespass, peaceful organizational picketing
directed at the business premises of a sub-lessee-employer. HELD: The dis-
32 This is all that is required by the 1960 amendment. 74 Stat. 889, 47 U.S.C.
{ 309(d) (Supp. IV, 1959-62), which provides:
(2) If the Commission finds on the basis of the application, the pleadings
filed, or other matters which it may officially notice that there are no sub-
stantial and material questions of fact and that a grant of the application
would be consistent with subsection (a) of this section, it shall make the grant,
deny the petition, and issue a concise statement of the reasons for denying
the petition, which statement shall dispose of all substantial issues raised by
the petition.
In view of the inability of the Commission and the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia to accomplish the Congressional objective of providing an expeditious
means of hearing objections to the applications for construction permits, the best
solution may well be to abolish the intervention and protest procedures altogether. The
Commission could then admit adverse parties in interest at its discretion. Southwestern
Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
1 222 Cal. App. 2d 378, 35 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1963).
2 Respondent is not a party to any labor dispute.
a Restatement, Torts {{ 157-164 (1938) especially 4 158.
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trict court reversed and remanded4 the case to the county court fora redeter-
mination of the conflict between respondent's property rights and appellant's
right of free speech as expressed through the medium of picketing, within
the framework of five standards: (1) To what degree the private property
involved is distinguishable from public property similarly devoted; (2)
Whether the communication would be unobjectionable on public property;
(3) Whether the communication was intended for persons naturally upon
the premises because of its use; (4) Whether the owner's rights of privacy
and enjoyment as distinguished from his right of control were involved;
(5) Whether there were alternate means of communication available to the
trespasser 5
It has been stated that the essential purpose and primary significance
of the constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech is "that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market. . . ."° Although, in its terms, the grant of the right is uncondi-
tional and the right itself is considered a fundamental personal one,' it was
not intended or at least has not been interpreted as an absolute right, i.e.,
protecting every possible use of language.* However, infringement of this
right is tolerated only when the mode of its use or its content creates a "clear
and present danger" of a substantive evil and its restriction will prevent
such evil .°
In Thornhill v. Alabama, 1° the United States Supreme Court held in-
valid, as an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech, an Alabama statute
which, in broad terms, banned all picketing. In so doing the Court extended
the protection of the First Amendment to picketing and declared that this
activity could be prohibited only when the requisites of the "clear and
present danger" standard were present. While it recognized the states' power
"to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants," 11
4 As of this writing, the case is pending before the California Supreme Court.
5 Appellant conceded that it had other means available to it to contact the em-
ployees. Opening Brief for Appellant, p. 4.
6 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). See Brandwen, Battle of the
First Amendment: A Study in Judicial Interpretation, 40 N.C.L. Rev. 273 (1962).
7 E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1919); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
8 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Cf. Justice Black and the First
Amendment Absolutes: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 549 (1962); Mendelson,
On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 Calif. L. Rev.
821 (1962).
9 Dennis v. United States, supra . note 8; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; Q
Schenck v. United States, supra note 8. In Dennis the Court departs from the "clear and
present danger" test as originally formulated in the Schenck case. The original interpre-
tation required an imminent danger. The departure requires a balancing of the gravity
of the harm against the probability.of its occurrence, i.e., the greater the gravity of the
harm the less need be the probability of its occurrence. See Lusk, The Present Status of
the "Clear and Present Danger Test"—A Brief History and Some Observations, 45
Ky. L. Rev. 576 (1957). .
10 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
11 Id. at 104.
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the Court removed picketing, one of the most effective of union weapons,
from the scope of that power.
The Court subsequently concluded, however, that picketing involved
more than ordinary speech and more than the survival of communicated
ideas in the "competition of the market."" While there was an element of
communication in picketing, this element could not be treated in isolation
from its other components." The Court recognized that in actual practice
picketing was geared to bring about its objectives, not through a change of
intellectual conviction, but through the exertion of various economic and
social pressures; thus, picketing necessarily involved both this coercion and
pressure as well as the aspect of free expression. If picketing were granted
the full protection of the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment and
if, in consequence, could only be restricted upon meeting the requisites of the
"clear and present danger" standard, then the states would neither be able
to exert sufficient control over their domestic economies nor adequately
regulate internal trade—acts admittedly within their power. 14
Thus, the retreat from the Thornhill doctrine began. In a case where
the union's picketing objective, if attained, would have resulted in a violation
of the state's public policy as embodied in its antitrust laws, an injunction
against the picketing was upheld.15 Where the picketing objective was the
creation of a union shop, the Court upheld an injunction prohibiting such
activity on the basis that the state's public policy, striking the balance
between protection of self-employers and maintenance of union standards,
was not "so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people that it must
be found an unconstitutional choice" In Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc.,"
the state court issued an injunction against picketing on the basis that its
objective was to coerce the employer to interfere in his employees' choice as
to whether they should unionize. The state's declared policy was that the
employees should have freedom in such choice. The Court stated that the
protection to be afforded picketing was not as broad as had been pronounced
in the Thornhill decision and that a state could enjoin picketing which would
prevent effectuation of its public policy. But the Court also stated that "the
mere fact that there is picketing does not automatically justify its restraint
without an investigation into its conduct and purposes. State courts, no
more than state legislatures, can enact blanket prohibition against picket-ing.ms
12 Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
13 "The factors on which the union primarily relies are fear, prudence, sympathy,
and social embarrassment, rather than on reason or a change of intellectual conviction."
Drinker, Some Observations on the Four Freedoms of the First Amendment 31 (1957).
0 14 The Court upheld a state statute allowing picketing carried on without "intimi-
dation or coercion" and which did not involve "fraud, violence, breach of the peace or
threat thereof." However, the Court was not faced with the validity of a conviction
under the statute. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
12 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 US ; 490 (1949).
16 Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
17 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
18 Id. at 294-95. In Chauffeurs Local Union v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958) (per
curiam), the Court, citing Thornhill, reversed a Kansas state court's decision enjoining
union picketing. It seems that the injunction amounted to a blanket prohibition. For
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None of these cases involved the question of whether a union has the
right to picket on or otherwise use private property. Nevertheless, the ration-
ale of these decisions is relevant to an examination of that question, especially
in view of certain statements in the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v.
Alabanta. 1°
In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness was convicted under an Alabama trespass
statute after refusing to discontinue the distribution of religious literature on
the street of a company owned town which functioned as any other town in
the country. The Court reversed the conviction, and in the course of its
opinion stated that legal title alone did not always give the owner absolute
dominion over the property in question. The more an owner, for his own
purposes, allows the public to use his premises, the less may he restrict the
constitutional rights of those who accept his invitation. It was further sug-
gested that the right of free speech occupies a preferred position in any
balancing process with the rights of property owners.
The few state courts which have dealt specifically with the problem of the
right to picket in conflict with property rights have either refused to take
cognizance of the controversy because of the pre-emption of state court
jurisdiction by federal labor law, 2° or having recognized jurisdiction to enjoin
a trespass, 2 ' have decided or implied that they would have decided the issue
on the basis of the Marsh decision. Of these latter state decisions, one,
by an evenly divided court, affirmed an injunction restraining the shopping
center owner from interfering with the union. 22 A second decision affirmed
an order denying the union's motion for summary judgment on the basis that
it was a fact question as to whether the shopping center appeared to be public
property. 23
 A third decision dismissed a complaint on the basis that the
tenant had no standing to enjoin a trespass.24
The five standards proposed by the Schwartz-Torrance court as the
solution to this shopping center picketing problem incorporate the Marsh
rationale in numbers one, two and four, which relate, respectively, to the
degree of distinction between the private property involved and public
property similarly devoted, to whether the communication would be unobjec-
a complete compilation of state picketing laws, see Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
Labor Relations Expediter 59 (1961).
to 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
20 Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, 58 Wash.2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961). State
courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a controversy arguably within the provisions of
the Labor Management Relations Act. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959). See Hanley, Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor's No Man's Land: 1960,
48 Geo. L.J. 709 (1960).
21 The United States Supreme Court expressly left unanswered the question of
whether a state court could enjoin a trespass by a union. Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butchers Workmen v. Fairlawn Meat, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
22 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich.
547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963). This case involved the distribution of handbills and did
not involve picketing.
23 Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees, 16 Wis.2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876
(1962).
24 Nahas v. Local 905, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 144 Cal. App.2d 808, 301 P.2d
932 (1956).
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tionable on public property, and to whether the owner's rights of privacy
and enjoyment as distinguished from his right of control were involved.
It is submitted that these standards are inapplicable to the shopping
center picketing situation. Even if it were assumed by the court that the
rationale of the Marsh decision should not be restricted to its facts,25 there
is no indication as to the factual situations to which it would or could be
applied. Restricting the present consideration to the particular use of property
involved in the Schwartz-Torrance case, would the rationale of Marsh en-
compass all shopping centers or only those of a certain size, or would it
depend on the particular public conveniences provided in the center? Does
the operation of a shopping center serve an essentially public function as does
the operation of a company town? Indeed this was a factor which the Marsh
court heavily relied on in reaching its decision. But even if the Marsh rationale
is not limited to its factual context, it still would have no application to the
shopping center picketing situation. The Court in Marsh was dealing with
freedom of religion and speech; it was not dealing with picketing. In view
of the recent decisional law which has affirmed restrictions on the right to
picket—notwithstanding First Amendment protection—any reliance placed
on the Marsh decision as a solution to the present problem would appear to
be unwarranted. The right to picket is not equated with the right of free
expression and has not been extended but restricted.
In standards numbered three and five, relating to whether the communi-
cation was intended for persons naturally upon the premises because of its
use, and to whether there were alternate means of communication available,
the Schwartz-Torrance court seems to have incorporated the tests used in
determining the rights of union organizers to utilize company property which
are granted by federal labor law."' It is submitted that these standards are as
equally inapplicable to the shopping center picketing problem as those
gleaned from Marsh. These "federal labor law" tests determine the statutory
rather than the constitutional rights of a union to make use of an employer's
premises. In the present case the court is faced with the question of whether
or not an application of state police power which results in the removal of
labor union pickets from private property, not belonging to the employer,
through the implementation of an injunction against trespassing upon the
property, amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of that power as a denial
of freedom of speech. In such a case it does not seem logical to place the
conduct within the scope of a policy which was set down in a series of
cases" that determined the rights of a union to carry on solicitation and
informational activities—not picketing—on the employer's property. This is
25 There is some authority that it should be. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S.
226, 236 (1949) (dissenting opinion); Marsh v. Alabama, supra note 19 (dissenting
opinion); People v. Goduto, 21 III. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (1961), noted in 3 B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 289 (1962).
26
 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Stowe
Spinning Co., supra note 25; Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
See Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property—A Discussion of Property Rights,





particularly so when such policy is the product of a "federal public policy"
declared as legislation, the express purpose of which is to promote labor
organization.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the utilization of the injunctive device
to deny unions the right to picket on shopping center property is not an
abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of speech.
Since the Vogt decision, it is not doubted that prohibitions against picketing
will be sustained where the manner in which the picketing is conducted or
the attainment 'of the picketing objective would prevent effectuation of a
state's public policy formulated pursuant to a valid exercise of its police
power.28 Certainly, a policy protecting the integrity of a non -employer's
property rights is such a valid public objective, 23 and is not such a choice,
as between the competing interests of the union and of the property owner,
as to be "so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people" 3° as to be
unconstitutional.
VINCENT A. SIANO
Corporations—Entity Theory—Derivative Actions—Pro Rata Indi-
vidual Recovery.—Sblensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp. 1—In a
prior action, minority shareholders brought a derivative suit against the
corporation's directors. The trial court decided for the plaintiffs, and ordered
an accounting from the defendant directors of transactions which led to
corporate losses. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed. Plain-
tiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois which reversed the
intermediate decision and reinstated the trial court's decree for an account-
ing. On remand, the trial court ordered an accounting which, however,
was never made since both sides agreed to a compromise whereby the de-
fendants agreed to buy the shares of the minority holders at five times their
value, and to pay all legal and court costs. At this point, a third party,
owner of forty-five shares, petitioned to intervene on grounds that the com-
promise imperiled an adequate recovery on the part of the corporation.
The court denied the petition and approved the compromise. The instant
case is the petitioner's appeal, in which, Burke, P. J., dissenting, it was
HELD• The lower court erred in approving the compromise inasmuch as it
varied from the Supreme Court's order for an accounting, and in denying
the intervenor's petition inasmuch as his ownership of forty-five shares gave
28 "Today, the Court signs the formal surrender .... State courts and state legisla-
tures are free to decide whether to permit or suppress any particular picket line for any
reason other than a blanket policy against all picketing.. . ." Teamsters Union v. Vogt,
Inc., supra note 10, at 297 (dissenting opinion). See Jones, The Right To Picket—
Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 995 (1954).
29 "[A] state, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal or civil law,
and whether announced by its legislature or its courts could constitutionally enjoin
peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy." Teamsters Union v.
Vogt, Inc., supra note 10, at 293.
30 Supra note 16, at 479.
1 —III. App.—, 194 N.E.2d 35 (1963).
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